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INTRODUCTION 
South Africa has never been a welfare state in the sense that it has not provided all its people 
with a set of social policies to guarantee the minimum standard of living. The apartheid state 
was a welfare state for whites but not for blacks. However, the problems the country faces, 
namely chronic mass unemployment and increasing poverty in the context of globalisation and 
post-industrialisation, have certain similarity in structure with what the Northern welfare states 
are experiencing, although in the South African case the problems were, historically speaking, 
much more serious and more complicated because of its racial aspects (Makino, 2004:6). 
Under white minority rule during the twentieth century a South African social security system 
was established along the lines of early social security in Western Europe, where it evolved 
mainly as social insurance, first for the industrial workforce and later for the whole population. 
In apartheid South Africa an embryonic welfare state was instituted to protect whites against 
various contingencies. The expansion of this system to other groups ironically put South Africa 
in the uncommon situation of being a semi-industrial country with the trappings of a modern 
social welfare state, the core of which is the provision of a basic pension for everyone in need. 
South African social security evolved into two main components: occupational insurance and 
social assistance. 
Occupational insurance included: retirement benefits for a substantial proportion of the 
formally employed labour force; a somewhat inadequate system of workers’ compensation; a 
system of unemployment insurance which could not address the major unemployment risks 
associated with structural rather than cyclical unemployment; and health insurance for the 
better skilled, in conjunction with universal health care for those who could not afford private 
care. 
Social assistance had three main pillars: social old-age pensions, disability grants, and child and 
family grants, all means tested to ensure that they were targeted at the poorest (Van der Berg, 
1997:482-485; Van der Berg, 2002:1-46). 
THE ORIGINS OF A PRO-WHITE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
In pre-colonial South Africa the welfare needs of individuals were met through the wider 
African society and communalism, co-operation and mutual support by individuals; the social 
group was thus highly developed. The foundations of racial discrimination, the denigration of 
indigenous ways, paternalism in the social services and the distorted nature of social welfare 
policies favouring whites as a welfare elite were laid during colonial times (Patel, 1992:34-35). 
In the seventeenth century the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope began to 
raise money for poor relief through the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). After the British 
occupation of the Cape Colony in 1806, the beginnings of organised social welfare services 
were established. Religious organisations, particularly the DRC, had begun creating 
institutional welfare resources such as the first orphanage, founded in 1814. As the century 
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progressed, a pattern emerged in organized social welfare provision with an emphasis on the 
care of children, care of the physically handicapped and the relief of indigence. In all instances, 
the emphasis was upon white people. After the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) the plight of poor 
whites elicited an immediate response from community and church; Afrikaans women’s 
organisations and the DRC reacted by providing aid to poor whites at the local community 
level (Kruger, 1992:110-123,157,160-162; McKendrick, 1988:7-10; Potgieter, 1970:10-18). 
Poor relief was the major component of the social security programme until the end of the 
1920s. Later, social old-age pensions became the dominant mode of support of the poor. 
Occupational insurance for retirement became institutionalised after the 1920s. It was based on 
contributions paid into a fund by employers and employees, according to contractual 
agreement, which upon retirement gave the employee certain pre-defined benefits. In as far as 
there was an element of compulsion, in accordance with agreements entered into between 
employers and employees to make such provision for retirement, occupational insurance was a 
form of social security, although – unlike the position in many other countries – contributions 
paid by employers and employees did not flow through the coffers of the state and were thus 
not included in social security taxes. Thus, coverage for retirement of the employed population 
by occupational insurance was extensive and has been growing rapidly, partly as a result of the 
absence of a state social pension scheme providing significant benefits (Van der Berg, 2002:15-
17,23). 
Similar to early 20th-century patterns of industrial conflict in Europe, the growing (white) 
labour movement in South Africa generated class conflict at the beginning of the 1920s. In 
1922 the country’s biggest industrial clash up to that date took place between organised labour 
and mining capital on the Witwatersrand industrial complex. Although the workers lost the 
industrial battle, by 1924 the consequences of this clash eventually resulted in a political 
victory for organised labour in partnership with their Afrikaner Nationalist allies. 
Soon after assuming power, the new Nationalist-Labour coalition, or Pact government as it was 
called, introduced “affirmative action style” legislation which reflected aspects of occupational 
insurance and social assistance. It served, inter alia, as an artificial bolster for white labour and 
as an attempt to address the poor white problem. Concentrated state programmes were devised 
to create work opportunities for them and in 1924 a state Department of Labour was created 
with the express object of finding work for them. Prior to the election the South African Party 
government had already implemented the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which gave the 
unionised workers a secure position against any attempt to undercut their wages by cheaper 
non-white wages (Davenport, 1987:531-4; McKendrick, 1988:11). With the introduction of the 
Wage Act in 1925 poor whites were to be sheltered and protected against competition from 
blacks in the labour market under so-called “civilized labour” policies. The Act aimed at fixing 
white wage rates at a level that may be described as the white survival line to prevent white 
employees from sinking socially and economically below such level – thus a line separating 
what was considered to be “civilized”, or white, living standards from so-called “uncivilized”, 
or non-white, standards of living. The Act also closed certain loopholes in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act’s protection of white employment. The purpose was to eliminate the economic 
incentive to employ black miners. It is estimated that between 1924 and 1933 the Pact 
government transferred about 8 000 jobs from blacks to whites (Doxey, 1961:76-84,126,153-
157; Terreblanche, 2003:237). 
In 1926 the Pact introduced the Mines and Works Amendment Act to protect white 
mineworkers from displacement, thereby giving the Minister the power to reserve jobs for 
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whites more openly and directly (Yudelman, 1883:221-225). Job reservation for unskilled and 
indigent whites provided openings for careers in government institutions such as the police, the 
prison service, the postal service, the armed forces, the railways, agricultural settlements and 
municipalities. The Pact government’s industrial legislation aimed to provide unemployment 
insurance and social assistance, thus ensuring the long-term protection and entrenchment of 
white labour privileges. By 1939 the government had as good as eliminated the poor white 
problem (Davenport, 1987:534; McKendrick, 1988:11; Yudelman, 1983:237-239). 
While African, Coloured and Indian people’s problems remained relatively neglected, public 
concern about white poverty grew even further with the depression of the late 1920s. In 1928, 
at the instigation of the DRC, the Carnegie Corporation of New York was persuaded to fund a 
new approach to white indigence: a scientific investigation into the causes of white poverty, its 
extent and the means by which it could be reduced. The 1932 report of the Carnegie 
Commission of Enquiry was dramatic in the impact that it had on South African social welfare. 
The recommendations of the Commission were seminal to the creation of a state Department of 
Social Welfare in 1937. Besides white poverty, the welfare of children and of the handicapped 
received increasing attention through legislation, the establishment of local community-
sponsored welfare organisations, and the bonding together of local welfare organisations in 
national councils. 
The creation of a Department of Social Welfare signalled a conscious state decision to become 
more involved in welfare programmes. The services of the Department were primarily directed 
towards whites, who received more services and a higher standard of service than any other 
population group. The post-World War II public demand for a comprehensive system of social 
security in South Africa was declined by the government on the grounds of expense. With this 
decision, the South African government rejected an institutional approach to social welfare, and 
reaffirmed the traditional standpoint that the individual was primarily responsible for ensuring 
his or her own well-being. 
The final event of major significance for (white) social welfare in South Africa was the coming 
to power in 1948 of the National Party (NP) government. The policies of apartheid were to 
implement the mechanisms of separate development, also with regard to social welfare. 
Structurally, separate development in the period from 1951 to 1980 was reflected in the 
fragmentation of state welfare services according to race. From the 1950s onwards, the 
Department of Social Welfare had its welfare responsibilities for African, Indian and Coloured 
persons transferred to the Departments of Bantu Administration, Indian Affairs and Coloured 
Affairs, respectively. The separation of welfare services according to race group served to 
perpetuate and entrench discrimination in the quality of services. Social security benefits were 
paid to whites at a level higher than that paid to other groups. Whites were eligible for a greater 
range of personal social welfare services (McKendrick, 1988:11-16; Patel, 1992:37-39; 
Potgieter, 1970:18-39). 
Under apartheid, state welfare expenditure for whites represented an important economic and 
political stabiliser in government efforts to maintain white support. This was particularly 
evident during election campaigns, when salary increases and better social benefits were often 
announced for state employees. Black welfare needs, on the other hand, were badly neglected 
during the apartheid era (Patel, 1992:42-43). 
The apartheid government’s Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 can be regarded as another 
attempt to provide a measure of insurance for white labour against unemployment. The Act 
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enforced job reservation and racial separation in trade unions and was designed to afford the 
white group another legal barrier against non-white encroachment (Doxey, 1961:139,143). 
According to Van der Berg (1997:485), occupational retirement insurance expanded rapidly in 
the 1920s to include many skilled, mainly white, employees. The 1956 Pensions Funds Act was 
a milestone in regulating pension funds; but the norm of excluding the lower skilled from such 
coverage remained and in the context of apartheid this meant that almost all blacks were 
excluded. 
BLACK WORKERS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
Black expectations of a social security system were already evident by 1955. At Kliptown near 
Johannesburg the so-called Congress of the People, a multi-racial anti-apartheid movement 
consisting of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of 
Democrats (with a predominantly white membership) and the South African Coloured People’s 
Organisation, gathered to endorse the Freedom Charter – a document that envisaged a non-
racial, democratic South Africa. The contents of the Charter reflected rudimentary elements of 
social security such as unemployment benefits, health insurance, social old-age pensions, 
disability grants and child and family grants (Karis & Gerhart, 1977:184,205-208). 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, when rapid industrialization increasingly drew black workers into 
industry, occupational retirement insurance was widened to include less skilled workers. The 
mainly white trade unions were instrumental both in this and in having coverage extended to 
more industries (Van der Berg, 1997:485). 
But the gradual emergence of non-racial industrial unions during the 1970s challenged the 
comfortable “social contract” between the apartheid state, employers and white labour based on 
protectionism and cheap black labour. By the 1970s the official (white) labour movement was a 
spent force, with falling membership and a rapidly declining ability to protect members’ 
material interests. At the same time, black workers began building a modern labour movement, 
organizing on a formally non-racial class basis, and soon displaced the racist unions as the 
institutional centre of South African labour. Labour law reforms, introduced by the Wiehahn 
Commission of Enquiry between 1977 and 1979, opened civil society, allowing for the formal 
recognition of black trade unions (Adler & Webster, 2001:5,60). 
Although the black trade union movement became a political force in the 1970s, it rallied 
mainly around wage issues and political demands. Social security only really came to the fore 
as an issue in 1981, when the government tried to enforce the preservation of pension rights 
when people changed jobs. Ironically, the trade unions mobilized effectively against this move 
and their victory became another milestone in the empowerment of black workers. Thus social 
retirement insurance was initially instituted for whites, who dominated the skilled positions in 
formal employment, but was eventually extended to blacks (Van der Berg, 1997:486). 
From the 1960s onwards, fiscal expenditure on social assistance rose rapidly in the attempt to 
incorporate blacks into the system fully and eliminate the racial barriers which had allowed the 
white welfare state to prosper in the first place. A trend emerged towards reducing racial 
differentials in spending on social services. During the “late apartheid period” of the 1980s 
under PW Botha, changes and restructuring in social welfare reflected declining growth rates, 
which promoted an early drive towards neo-liberal restructuring, and an attempt to get 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians to support apartheid in the face of growing protest. By the late 
1980s the racial welfare gap had narrowed slightly. By 1990 whites accounted for only 23% of 
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welfare spending, whilst Coloureds and Indians received 24% and Africans 52% (Kruger, 
1992:178-179; Terreblanche, 2003:27-28; Van der Walt, 2000:70-71). 
On the other hand, since the 1980s the state continued to scale back its fiscal commitments as 
an economic recession had imposed budgetary constraints. This also implied a government cut 
back on welfare expenditure (Kruger, 1992:155,183; Marais, 2001:48; Patel, 1992:43). These 
fiscal constraints precluded increasing black benefits to white levels, and so deracialization was 
most readily accomplished where resistance to reducing white benefit levels was lowest. One 
such area was social pensions and grants, where the small numbers of elderly or disabled poor 
whites who qualified under the means test were politically marginal. When the 1980 
recommendation for compulsory preservation of pension rights upon withdrawal from a fund 
was written into the 1981 Preservation of Pension Interests Bill, black workers saw this as an 
attempt to deny them access to their own money as most black people see the state as the 
legitimate source of old-age pensions. Thus this measure met with such fierce resistance that 
the government was forced to withdraw the bill. After this victory trade unions took a far more 
active interest in retirement benefits (Van der Berg, 1997:488-490). 
The Tripartite Alliance, the RDP and GEAR 
After four years of planning, a “super” trade union federation, the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), was launched in November 1985 in Durban during the height of 
political unrest in the country. Its formation introduced a new dynamic into political unionism 
in South Africa. At its inception COSATU had a total membership of 450 000. In 1990 the 
federation claimed more than 1.2 million members organized in fourteen industrial unions 
(Baskin, 1991:34,53-58,88-90,448). 
The community-based unions which entered COSATU brought with them a strong tradition of 
support for the ANC (Finnemore, 1998:32). In 1987 COSATU endorsed the Freedom Charter. 
Then in February 1990 the Nationalist Party government of FW de Klerk unbanned political 
organizations such as the ANC, the PAC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
COSATU entered into negotiations with the ANC and the SACP and succeeded in formalising 
a strategic alliance, known as the Tripartite Alliance (Baskin, 1991:187-190,420,425,429-434). 
The Alliance was viewed from within the labour movement as designed to ensure that a 
working-class bias prevailed in the policies and programmes adopted by the ANC once it 
became the principal party of government. The Tripartite Alliance was forged to ensure that, 
henceforth, the newly democratic government in South Africa would be labour friendly 
(Southall & Wood, 1999:68). 
Prior to South Africa’s first democratic election in April 1994 the ANC agreed in principle to 
adopt COSATU’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – a programme that 
contained elements of social security in return for COSATU’s support in the elections. Thus the 
RDP formed the basis of the ANC’s election manifesto. Indeed, COSATU’s intervention was 
crucial in securing an election victory for the ANC (Baskin, 1994:1; Buhlungu, 1994:7-22; 
Marais, 2001:133; Terreblanche, 2003:108-109). According to Marais (2001:239), the RDP 
was also an ideological reference point that seems to confirm the political-historical continuity 
between the Freedom Charter and the realities of post-apartheid South Africa. 
The RDP originated in an attempt by labour to produce an accord that would tie a newly 
elected ANC government to a labour-driven development programme. As a “growth through 
redistribution” policy (Terreblanche, 2003:89) the RDP envisioned as a first priority: 
“beginning to meet the basic needs of people: jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, 
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telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and 
social welfare”. The RDP soon became the paradigm within which all development policies 
were to be discussed – an extended wish list in which the homeless, the landless, workers, and 
even international bankers could take equal comfort. From 1994 to 1996 the RDP became 
ostensibly the guiding document of the Government of National Unity, located in an RDP 
Office within President Mandela’s Office, under the immediate authority of Minister Without 
Portfolio Jay Naidoo – ex-General Secretary of COSATU (Midgley, 2001:269; Webster & 
Adler, 1998:1-2). 
Whereas retrenchments in social programmes were common during the 1980s, by the mid-
1990s there seemed to be growing support in international debates among political leaders for 
the proposition that market forces alone could not solve serious social problems. Therefore the 
new government focussed on meeting basic needs, eradicating poverty and investing in human 
capacities. It also undertook a major review of the country’s welfare system. The review sought 
to address the injustices of the system and to formulate a welfare strategy that was compatible 
with the new government’s developmentalist commitments. Following discussions with diverse 
constituencies, a draft White Paper for Social Welfare was published in 1995, which 
emphasised the concept of developmental social welfare. It was formally adopted by Cabinet in 
1997. South Africa’s RDP and its White Paper on developmental social welfare were thus 
clearly compatible with the social development approach and consistent with its humanitarian 
and “people-centred” values. While neo-liberal approaches prevailed in other parts of the 
world, the new South African government resurrected the social development approach and 
elevated it to a position of prominence (Midgley, 2001:267-269,271). 
In terms of social security the RDP did indeed achieve some remarkable results. In line with the 
new constitution’s provision that all citizens are entitled to social security, the government soon 
established a very extensive welfare system, catering for the aged, disabled, children in need, 
foster parents and many others too poor to meet their basic social requirements (Harsch, 
2001:9). For instance, free health care programmes were implemented for pregnant women and 
small children, and free meals were provided for between 3,5 to 5 million school children 
(Heymans, 1995:57; Marais, 2001:190). However, social welfare was not treated as a core issue 
of the RDP compared to other policy areas such as water, housing, electricity, and health. 
Unlike the housing policy goal of building over one million houses in five years there was no 
such target set for extending social grants. Rather, the welfare policy goal was stated to 
minimize the extent of dependency on the state (Makino, 2004:10). 
But the RDP soon ran into trouble. From the beginning the government lacked the capacity to 
implement it. Because RDP staff lacked proper implementation skills, huge backlogs in 
providing access to basic services, as defined in the RDP, occurred. Provincial 
maladministration of primary nutrition programmes took place and since 1994 there has been 
growing dissatisfaction with service delivery and employment creation as embedded in the 
RDP. The RDP did not spell out a detailed programme for attaining its main aims. It was too 
broadly formulated and ended up as a wish list for too many people (Heymans, 1995:61-63; 
Meyer, 2000:2; Terreblanche, 2003:109). For example, by March 1996 only R5 billion of R15 
billion allocated for reconstruction and development had been spent (Lee, 1998:5). 
According to Bond (2000:90,97-98) the RDP was “fatally undermined by timid politicians, 
hostile bureaucrats and unreliable private sector partners”. Naidoo, the RDP minister, did not 
command the respect of his ANC parliamentary colleagues and did not always see eye to eye 
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with President Mandela on RDP issues. Also, Naidoo’s implementation of the RDP had to cater 
too much to the satisfaction of capitalist interests. 
It became clear that the country’s economic and fiscal difficulties would impede the realisation 
of the RDP’s goals. Although the new government hoped for economic growth rates of 4-6% 
per annum, the actual growth rate was only slightly above the natural rate of population growth 
of about 2,5%. The government could not mobilise sufficient funds to meet the RDP’s 
objectives without redirecting allocations from the mainstream government departments. In a 
climate of resource scarcity, competition among ministers was intense and the prospect of 
having their budgets appropriated by the RDP administration was strongly resisted. In fact, 
most of the funding for the RDP’s programmes had come not from the South African 
government but from international donors, and it was generally project based. As economic 
considerations began to dominate government policy in the latter half of the 1990s, the lofty 
social commitments of the RDP were given less prominence than the need for rapid economic 
growth (Midgley, 2001:270). 
The death blow to the RDP was dealt in a White Paper on reconstruction and development 
published in November 1994. The White Paper departed significantly from the original RDP 
document. It introduced fiscal prudence not as a means of attaining RDP objectives, but as an 
added goal. The notion of redistribution was dropped, as the government’s major role in the 
economy was reduced to the task of managing the transformation. Given the ANC’s 
commitment to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic balance, no fiscal “space” was available 
for properly implementing the RDP and for the redistributive implications of its poverty-
alleviation programme and its emphasis on meeting basic needs (Terreblanche, 2003:109). The 
White Paper emphasised that social development could not take place without economic 
development, and encouraged the introduction of social programmes that generated rates of 
return on social expenditures and thus contributed directly to economic development. It meant a 
shift away from cash transfers through social grants (Makino, 2004:10-11). 
A final nail was driven into the coffin of the RDP when the new ANC government encountered 
its first major currency crisis, starting in February 1996 when the value of the rand plummeted 
by more than 25%. In order to calm domestic capital and foreign currency markets, the 
government embraced a conservative macro-economic strategy, “Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution” (GEAR). It was developed by a technical team of 15 policy makers comprised 
of officials from the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the South African Reserve Bank, 
three state departments, academics and two representatives of the World Bank. The ministry of 
the RDP was abolished in March 1996 and the office of the RDP was transferred to the office 
of the then Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki. In contrast to the RDP, GEAR therefore was not 
the product of consultation with COSATU and the SACP, and would generate considerable 
internal disagreement within the Tripartite Alliance (Bond, 2000:82,118; Kotzé, 2000:12; 
Terreblanche, 1999:2; Terreblanche, 2003:112-114,116; Webster & Adler, 1998:4). 
In essence GEAR implied that economic development in South Africa should be led by the 
private sector; the state should play a smaller role in the economy; state-owned assets should be 
privatized; there should be deep cuts in government spending; international competitiveness 
and an export-orientated economy should be encouraged; exchange controls should be relaxed; 
and social service delivery budgets and municipal infrastructure programmes should be 
reprioritized in order to address the claims of the poor to a fair package to meet their basic 
needs. Concurrently, those social services that could not be provided to all, or could be 
undertaken more effectively by the private sector such as social assistance grants to 
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impoverished children, were to be eliminated or scaled down. The central government would 
unilaterally set priorities and funds to be committed to social and sectoral policies (Bond, 
2000:78,116,183,187; Marais, 2001:163-165; Meyer, 2000:3-4; Van der Walt, 2000:71-73). 
“Growth through redistribution” was to be replaced by “redistribution through growth”. The 
poverty problem would be resolved through higher growth rates and the alleged “trickle-down” 
effect. In the GEAR strategy the redistribution of income is of secondary importance. The 
advocates of the “trickle-down” approach regarded job creation as the main mechanism for 
transmitting the additional income created by high economic growth rates to the poor 
(McKinley, 1997:141; Terreblanche, 2003:83,435). 
Perhaps the most important difference between the RDP and GEAR was that, while the former 
expected the state to conduct a people-orientated developmental policy, the latter saw South 
Africa’s economic “salvation” in a high economic growth rate that would result from a sharp 
increase in private capital accumulation in an unbridled capitalistic system. The government’s 
task in this was to refrain from economic intervention and to concentrate on the necessary 
adjustments that would create an optimal climate for private investment (Terreblanche, 
1999:5). 
REACTION TO GEAR AND THE SOCIAL SECURITY DILEMMA FOR THE ANC 
GOVERNMENT 
Since GEAR was substituted for the RDP, the ANC government has been lambasted severely 
by academics, inter alia leftist political economists, and labour leaders alike for its change in 
economic policy. Already in August 1996 the National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) 
raised questions as to whether GEAR would actually be able to realise its stated objectives. 
According to Asghar Adelzadeh (1996:3-5,22,27-28) of NIEP, GEAR failed, inter alia, to 
present an analytically sound and empirically justified strategy. He predicted that GEAR’s 
conservative macroeconomic framework would constrain growth, employment and 
redistribution, and that it would not meet the main RDP objectives. Adelzadeh argued that 
GEAR provided very little fiscal stimulus to reach the required growth rate of 6% and success 
was almost wholly dependent upon the response of the private sector. The plan would actually 
increase poverty and income distribution would deteriorate. Overall, the proposed growth 
framework and policy scenarios were “analytically flawed, empirically unsupportable, 
historically unsuitable for this country, and ...will lead to disappointment and failures in 
achieving the RDP objectives of fundamentally transforming the inherited patterns of 
inequality”. 
Critics of the ANC government’s economic policy such as McKinley (1997:132), Webster and 
Adler (1998:68), Bond (2000:38,49,55,83,184-185), Bond (2004:1-3), Marais (2001:95-
96,123-138,163) and Terreblanche (2003:83-87,95-107,115,436-439,446) argue that the 
eventual implementation of GEAR had an intriguing run-up. Already in the early 1990s the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had propagated a neo-liberal 
approach, an export-driven growth strategy and fiscal discipline for a democratized South 
Africa. The NP government published its Normative Economic Model (NEM) in March 1993, 
which was heavily influenced by the IMF’s neo-liberal dogma. When the ANC, together with 
other liberation organisations, started to negotiate with the NP for a new democratic political 
dispensation in 1990, it had little economic experience. The South African left prepared itself 
for a revolutionary take-over of both the state and the economy, and was therefore unprepared 
for an evolutionary reform process. Prior to 1994 the ANC was beguiled by a plethora of neo-
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liberalist corporate scenario-planning exercises and ANC leaders were fêted with private 
“orientation” sessions and confabs at exclusive game resorts. 
Soon after the 1990 thaw the World Bank opened its channels to the ANC and trade unions, 
and enlisted researchers associated with the democratic movement in its projects. Therefore 
“the soil of conciliation and consensus was being diligently tilled”, which for the ANC was a 
“political retreat” and a “defeat” for its left-wing. In terms of economic policy the ANC 
reached an “elite compromise” with the corporate sector. By signing a secret protocol on 
economic policy with the corporate sector and the NP government, the ANC accepted the NEM 
as the basis of the post-1994 economic policy. Thus the ANC won the proverbial political 
“war” but lost the economic “peace” to big business and capitalist interests. By 1996 the ANC 
government’s economic policy had acquired an overt class character. It was geared to service 
the respective prerogatives of domestic and international capital and the aspirations of the black 
bourgeoisie at the expense of the impoverished majority’s hopes for a less iniquitous social and 
economic order. This was a momentous shift for a party with a strong working-class 
constituency, closely allied with the SACP and COSATU. For Terreblanche (2003:115) GEAR 
was “openly Thatcherite in content and tone” and, according to Van der Walt (2000:75), it 
“violates the promise of ‘A Better Life for All’”. 
Indeed, since the GEAR macroeconomic strategy was announced, it has not lived up to all the 
expectations of its planners to enhance growth, employment or redistribution. In the period 
1996-2001 the economy grew by only 2,7% a year instead of the 6% as originally envisaged. 
Employment shrank instead of growing by 3%. Instead of the additional 1,3 million job 
opportunities supposed to be created by 2001, more than 1 million jobs have been destroyed 
since 1996. The cause of this was the introduction of labour-saving technologies, increased out-
sourcing and a market turn towards using casual and contract labour. Real government 
investment grew at 1,8% instead of 7,1% and real private sector investment dropped sharply – 
from a 6,1% growth rate in 1996 to -0,7% in 1998. Welfare spending fell from 9,6% of the total 
budget in 1998/99 to 9,3% in 2000/01, and health spending from 12,2% to 11,7%. The 
redistributive effect of the transfer of income has not been large enough to make a difference to 
the lives of those trapped in the vicious circle of growing unemployment, violent criminality 
and contagious diseases. GEAR actually set no redistributive targets (Bond, 2000:51, 193-194; 
Bond, 2004:1-2; Marais, 2001:163,170-175; Terreblanche, 2003:117,121,432,436; Van der 
Walt, 2000:74). 
Thus South Africa experienced jobless growth, while major layoffs took place in both the 
public and the private sector. In 1997 in the gold mining industry alone there were 30 000 
retrenchments (Harsch, 2001:5; Lee, 1998:5-6; Meyer, 2000:11-12). According to Meyer 
(2000:11-2), the 1997/1998 national budget provided for further marginalization of social 
services, particularly in the health and education departments, thus contributing to a broadly 
perceived conception in labour circles that the government is attempting to shed its social 
responsibility role as envisaged in the RDP. 
As mentioned before, the ANC’s unilateral acceptance of GEAR generated considerable 
internal disagreement within the Tripartite Alliance, especially from the ranks of COSATU and 
the SACP. The RDP did live on rhetorically as the ANC’s “election manifesto” for the 1999 
general election as attempts were made to align GEAR with the socially progressive objectives 
of the former. During the campaign the ANC declared that the RDP “was the only relevant 
detailed programme to carry South Africa to freedom and social justice”. On the other hand, 
however, ex-President Mandela, President Thabo Mbeki and his Finance Minister Trevor 
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Manuel, declared GEAR to be “non-negotiable”. The ANC government defended the GEAR 
plan as an elaboration of principles and perspectives contained in the RDP. It argued that the 
specific measures in the GEAR plan were merely refinements of positions established in the 
RDP (Kotzé, 2000:12; Marais, 2001:162,169,187; Terreblanche, 2003:112,144,450,461). This 
prompted Bond (2000:192-195) to describe the ANC’s strategy as a “tendency to talk left” but 
to “act right”. 
Union opposition to privatization in South Africa included concern about the socio-economic 
impact of restructuring and privatization, since it would lead to an enormous number of 
retrenchments and job losses, and therefore labour-market insecurity. The unions also 
harboured fears of the loss of social security benefits, such as pension/providence, medical aid 
and other related benefits as part of any workplace restructuring/privatization programme. 
(Harsch, 2001:4; Marais, 2001:162; Meyer, 2000:8,11; Terreblanche, 1999:6; Terreblanche, 
2003:461). In COSATU’s view, it was “blindingly obvious that it is not possible to have a 
developmental budget within an anti-developmental economic framework” (Marais, 2001:188). 
COSATU opposed privatization of state-owned enterprises as envisaged by GEAR because of 
its negative effects on the socio-economic interests of the poor and the working class. 
According to COSATU, the goal of the privatized companies would be maximization of profits 
for shareholders, not provision of services to the poor. The result would be job losses and 
increased costs for the services (Knight, 2001:4). For instance, COSATU President John 
Gomomo (1997:4), complained about the lack of job creation and redistribution and of social 
spending that had been severely cut as a result of GEAR. 
In this context both COSATU and the SACP became increasingly critical of GEAR. 
COSATU’s 6th National Congress rejected GEAR but did not demand that the ANC drop the 
policy. The SACP aired its discontent more stridently than COSATU, while COSATU spoke 
strongly and even staged a series of protests and strikes against job losses. (Marais, 2001:162-
163,180; Webster & Adler, 1998:5). According to Marais (2001:182,185), COSATU’s half-
hearted efforts to contest the implementation of the GEAR plan were not only a reflection of 
the gradual weakening of labour’s influence in the socio-economic realm, but should also be 
read as a reminder of the limits of its influence. Like the SACP, it has been unable to shift the 
paradigm of the government’s economic thinking. 
THE PROS AND CONS OF THE MBEKI ADMINISTRATION WITH REGARD TO 
THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
Political economists concur that growing unemployment and poverty, the lack of job security 
and inadequate safety nets as a form of social assistance to reduce the vulnerability stemming 
from unemployment are South Africa’s greatest social challenges at present, as there are signs 
that growing poverty is creating grave dissatisfaction at grass-roots level in the Tripartite 
Alliance (Terreblanche, 2003:461; Van der Berg, 2002:1-5,7,32; Van der Berg & Burger, 
2002:1,69,74). In the light of worsening poverty and the lack of social delivery South Africa 
was, according to Bond (2003:160-161), “a socio-economic time bomb”. 
When, early in 2002, the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security for South 
Africa (the Taylor Committee) proposed a slow march towards a basic income grant as a means 
of granting social security benefits to the poor, the state at first responded with a notable lack of 
enthusiasm. For instance, Finance Minister Manuel said a basic income grant was “fiscally 
unsustainable”. However, with the escalation of unemployment, government spokespersons 
began to hint at public work programmes or special employment programmes as one way to tap 
http://socialwork.journals.ac.za/
http://dx.doi.org/10.15270/45-3-201
235 
Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 2009:45(3) 
the labour power of the poor to reduce the impact of structural unemployment (Makino, 
2004:21; Mbeki, 2003:1-5; Meth, 2003:114; SACBC, 2003:1; Van der Berg, 2002:33). 
During the 2004 general election campaign, the ANC seemed to have oscillated between a pro-
RDP and a pro-GEAR stance. In the party’s election manifesto the ANC proclaimed that the 
RDP served as its guide for a vision for the next ten years. The manifesto also stated that the 
ANC would continue the growth, reconstruction and development of the country. Party 
spokespersons claimed the ANC “has never renounced the RDP as a concept, but that the 
GEAR plan was imperative to save the South African economy from the crisis that the party 
inherited from the apartheid regime”. The RDP would not be reimplemented as an official 
programme, as GEAR still formed an integral part of the government’s economic policy (Die 
Burger, 13.1.2004:4). 
However, after an extensive election campaign tour to various rural and urban constituencies 
throughout the country, and having won the 2004 general election with an overwhelming 
majority of almost 70% of the parliamentary seats, the ANC seemed to have grasped the 
tremendous extent of unemployment and poverty that prevailed in South Africa and the huge 
expectations voters held of the government to alleviate the situation. On 18 May 2004 President 
Mbeki launched the first Expanded Public Works Programme in a rural area of the Limpopo 
Province (Mbeki, 2004:1-4). 
The Mbeki administration devoted 50% of the national budget to welfare (Pottinger, 2008:17) 
and by the end of his tenure as President South Africa had seven types of social grants in its 
social assistance system: an old age grant; a disability grant; a war veterans’ grant; a foster 
grant (for a child’s carers who are legally foster parents); a care dependency grant (for disabled 
children under 18 years); a child support grant (for children under the age of 9 years) and a 
grant in aid (an additional grant for recipients of old age, disability or war veterans’ grant who 
are unable to care for themselves). All grants were subject to means tests (Makino, 2004:1). 
Indeed, this implied that the state’s massive social security programme entailed the extension of 
social grants from 3 million people in 1997 to 12.5 million South Africans in 2008, 8 million of 
whom were children under the age of 14 years (ANC, 2009:4; Zuma, 2008:3-4). 
Mbeki and his economic managers had brought unprecedented macro-economic stability to the 
country, and millions of citizens were enjoying better living standards than they had ever done 
before, although high levels of poverty remained an intractable feature of the landscape. 
However, by 2007, the boom years were ebbing. The sense of well-being created by the good 
times was being eroded as the economic indicators turned negative before the government 
could fully consolidate its gains. As a result of the implementation of social policies through 
the RDP and GEAR South Africa had become a perilously dependent society. Almost 
unnoticed, one-third of the country’s households, the poorest, had become dependant on state 
grants for survival. Only a very high growth rate could underwrite the continuation of these 
policies. 
In addition, the Mbeki government’s ill-considered comment that the principles of GEAR were 
non-negotiable would come back to haunt it as no serious attempt was made to bring the unions 
on board. And in June 2005, Mbeki dismissed Jacob Zuma as deputy president of South Africa. 
The ostensible reason was that he would be facing charges for corruption in regard to the ill-
fated procurement of arms for the post-apartheid South African National Defence Force. But 
Mbeki’s explanation for Zuma’s dismissal became increasingly threadbare as time went on. 
The President himself had done everything possible to impede investigation into the scandal. 
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The reason for Zuma’s dismissal, then, became ineluctably linked to Mbeki’s own political 
interests. Zuma, his supporters believed, was fired not because he was corrupt, but because he 
was beginning to threaten Mbeki’s plans for an extended presidency. 
This assumption became the rallying cry for various factions at the ANC’s national conference 
at Polokwane in December 2007: the COSATU unionsists – smarting from marginalisation and 
insult; the communists – forced into humiliating retractions of allegations about Mbeki’s 
“Zanufication” of the movement; the poor – despairing of ever getting decent service; the 
unemployed – tired of waiting for jobs; and the elite – excluded from office and partonage. 
Thus Mbeki was repudiated by the majority of his own party membership. He was ousted as 
leader of the ANC by the votes of three of every five delegates, the victor being Jacob Zuma 
who was elected as the new ANC president. After Polokwane, Mbeki’s cabinet was effectively 
purged from the senior decision-making bodies of the ANC (Pottinger, 2008:15,64-65,71). In 
March 2008 Mbeki finally fell from grace when the ANC’s national executive “recalled” him 
from the office of President and he resigned as the country’s leader. Kgalema Motlante was 
appointed as a “caretaker” president until the general election of April 2009, after which Jacob 
Zuma became South Africa’s next President. 
THE ANC’S POST-POLOKWANE POSITION ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
Already in September 2008, Jacob Zuma as ANC president stated that the party was building a 
development state and not a welfare state. Therefore its anti-poverty programmes had to “seek 
to empower people to take themselves out of poverty, while creating adequate social nets to 
protect the most vulnerable in our society such as older persons, people with disabilities and 
vulnerable children” (Zuma, 2008:4). 
At the Tripartite Alliance’s summit meeting in October 2008 it became evident that in terms of 
its policy vision for a post-Mbeki era the ANC would move towards the left. The social 
security policy envisaged by the ruling party was clearly influenced by COSATU and SACP 
thinking in this regard. The state would become much more interventionist on behalf of the 
poor. Thus the emphasis on policy development shifted from a top-down driven ANC executive 
approach during the Mbeki era to a more inclusive and consultative process within the 
Tripartite Alliance. 
The meeting agreed that poverty remained widespread and agreed on a policy based on three 
pillars. Firstly, the basic social endowment “that everyone must have”, including the concept of 
a social wage (free basic water, electricity, sanitation, basic education, subsidized housing), 
would be provided. Secondly, individuals should be in a position to access the following 
benefits: health insurance, retirement benefits, disability, occupational accidents, and 
unemployment. Thirdly, there should be security-type benefits that are voluntary and the 
government had an important role to regulate the private market to ensure consumer protection. 
In addition, the following policy proposals needed to be discussed by the Tripartite Alliance’s 
constitutional structures: a department of social security; the extension of child support grants 
for children aged 15 to 18; a flat benefit for unemployed workers whose UIF has expired; a 
basic income grant, linked to skills development; a mandatory contributory social insurance 
system; a uniform national pension scheme; an ombudsman for social security to deal with 
complaints; and the implementation of a national health insurance scheme, with free health care 
at the point of delivery (The Times Blog Archive, 2008:4). 
In essence, the ANC’s manifesto for the 2009 general election reflected most of the Tripartite 
Alliance’s policy vision on social security at its October 2008 summit meeting. The party stated 
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that the space to engage on policies and theories has opened up because of international 
recognition of the failure of policies such as neo-liberalism, liberalisation and deregulation and 
a new acceptance of the key economic role of the state. Therefore the developmental state wil 
play a central and strategic role in the economy, inter alia in creating and maintaining social 
infrastructure. Apart from reiterating the extension of child support grants for children aged 15 
to 18, the extension of social security to more unemployed adults and the introduction of a 
contributory social security system, the ANC government would consult widely with various 
sectors “to establish a consensus on our future social security system to make it comprehensive 
and inclusive”. Therefore it would “look at measures to achieve a bolder expansion of 
unemployment insurance”. The mandatory contributory social security system to be introduced 
must provide for guaranteed retirement, disability and survivor benefits, whilst at the same time 
streamlining the provisions governing road accident claims, occupational injuries and the 
unemployment benefits (ANC, 2009:5-7,13; Mokonyane, 2009:5). 
CONCLUSION 
In its reaction to the ANC’s election manifesto the Sunday Independent commented that the 
party relied on its massive spending on social welfare if jobs could not be created faster. But 
there seemed to be no agreement on basic income grants as the manifesto talked vaguely of 
establishing “a consensus on a future social security system”. And according to insiders the 
new comprehensive social security will cost more than the budget allocation (Sunday 
Independent, 11.1.2009:2). According to Terreblanche (2003:33-34), the South African 
population has developed into three identifiable groups consisting of about 15 million people 
each. The first group consists of about 4 million whites and 11 million blacks, receiving 88% of 
total income. The second 15 million consist mainly of blacks, receiving about 8% of total 
income. The third mainly black group receives only 4% of total income. To cater only partially 
for the social needs of a population of whom approximately 43% are unemployed and indigent 
puts a tremendous tax burden upon the middle class as 6 million South Africans receive some 
form of social grant from the state. 
Despite some positive characteristics of the history of social security provision in modern 
South Africa, Van der Berg (1997:492,498,501) correctly argues that, until the labour surplus 
situation in the country has been overcome effectively, which could take decades, 
unemployment insurance, for one, can only cover a small part of the labour force for a short 
period against the scourge of unemployment. The challenge facing South Africa is to offer a 
safety net for the poor in the labour pool, mainly because of the absence of remunerated 
employment, while insuring those in employment against major contingencies (loss of 
employment, old age, ill health, disability). Although the social security system has developed 
to almost unprecedented levels for a semi-industrial country, there are still major gaps. How to 
effectively fill these gaps in light of the ANC’s election focuses on poverty relief will be a 
major challenge for the post-2009 ANC government. 
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